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Some Options for the Navy
Ronald O’Rourke
The Navy, like other U.S. military services, faces a challenge in funding vari-ous program goals within a budget that is expected to experience little or no
real growth. This challenge will be compounded if the change in the nation’s
projected budget and debt situation that has developed since the 2008 financial
crisis leads to a real decline in the Department of Defense (DoD) budget.
The total number of ships in the Navy is to be bolstered over the next decade
by the entry into service of substantial numbers of relatively inexpensive Littoral
Combat Ships (LCSs) and Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs). In addition, the
unit capability of Navy ships, aircraft, and other systems will increase in coming
years as a result of the introduction of new platforms and technologies. If, how-
ever, the Navy’s budget does not increase in real terms, the Navy faces a longer-
term prospect of a decline in ship and aircraft numbers that would offset at least
some of the gains realized in unit capability. The resulting fleet could have a rich
collection of capabilities for performing various missions but lack the capacity
(i.e., numbers) for performing those missions simultaneously in all desired geo-
graphic areas.
If Navy budget pressures are compounded by a real decline in the DoD bud-
get, policy makers could face difficult choices to fund programs for some kinds
of Navy capabilities but not others. If so, the resulting fleet could have gaps in ca-
pability as well as capacity. These developments could occur at a time when the
United States faces various international security challenges, including a poten-
tially significant challenge from a modernized Chinese military capable of act-
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Although the Navy forms only a part of the U.S. military, which in turn forms
only a part of the nation’s overall tool kit for defending its interests and pursuing
its policy goals, a Navy with insufficient ability to maintain desired levels of
forward-deployed presence and engagement, to respond to contingencies and
contain crises, or to conduct combat operations of certain kinds could contrib-
ute to a situation in which American policy makers might need to prioritize key
U.S. interests and goals and reconsider the national strategy for defending those
interests and pursuing those goals.
THE NAVY’S PROGRAMS-VS.-RESOURCES SITUATION
Shipbuilding accounts for only 35 percent or so of Department of the Navy
(DON) procurement funding and only 10 percent or so of DON’s entire base-
line budget.1 Even so, examining funding pressures in the Navy’s shipbuilding
account can be a useful means of gaining an understanding of the service’s over-
all programs-vs.-resources situation, for two reasons. First, the Navy balances
funding demands for shipbuilding against those for other programs, so funding
pressures in the shipbuilding account are likely to be mirrored by similar pres-
sures in other accounts. Second, ships are central to the Navy: it is difficult to
have a navy without them; many of the Navy’s manned aircraft, unmanned vehi-
cles, and weapons are based on them; and much of the Navy’s other spending
funds their basing, crewing, operation, maintenance, and modernization.
The Navy’s five-year (fiscal year [FY] 2011–FY 2015) shipbuilding plan in-
cludes a total of fifty ships, or an average of ten per year. Such a rate represents an
increase over the single-digit numbers of ships that have been procured for the
last eighteen years (FY 1993–FY 2010) and is a little above the steady-state re-
placement rate for a fleet with 313 ships (the Navy’s force-level goal), which is
about 8.9 ships per year, assuming a weighted average ship life of thirty-five
years.
The Navy’s ability to assemble a five-year plan for fifty ships within available
resources does not, however, necessarily mean that the service has solved its
long-term challenge of shipbuilding affordability. The Navy was able to fund
this fifty-ship plan in part because twenty-five of those ships—half the total
—are relatively inexpensive LCSs and JHSVs. Since LCSs and JHSVs are to ac-
count eventually for about 25 percent of the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet,
they are temporarily overrepresented in the Navy’s shipbuilding plan.2 Beyond
FY 2015, as the LCS and JHSV programs run their courses and are procured in
smaller annual quantities, and particularly as the Navy enters the period for pro-
curing twelve replacement ballistic-missile submarines, or SSBN(X)s, the
amount of funding needed for an average of ten ships per year will increase
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substantially. The Navy preliminarily estimates the unit procurement cost of the
SSBN(X) at six to seven billion dollars in constant fiscal-year 2011 dollars—a
figure equivalent to roughly half the Navy’s annual budget for new ship con-
struction. The thirty-year shipbuilding plan acknowledges the pressure the
SSBN(X) program will place on the shipbuilding budget and shows reduced
rates of shipbuilding during the fifteen years (FY 2019–FY 2033) when the
twelve boats are to be procured.
The Navy’s thirty-year (FY 2011–FY 2040) shipbuilding plan does not in-
clude enough ships to support fully all elements of the Navy’s planned 313-ship
fleet over the long run. The Navy projects that if all 276 ships in the plan are
bought, the total number of ships in fleet will increase from 284 in FY 2011 to
320 in FY 2024, in part due to the
entry into service of substantial
numbers of LCSs and JHSVs; then
fall below 313 in 2027, reaching a
minimum of 288 in 2032 and
2033; and then increase to 301 by
the end of the thirty-year period.
The Navy projects that the fleet would have significant shortfalls during the
latter years of the plan in two types of combat ships—attack submarines and
cruisers/destroyers:
• The attack submarine shortfall, which in previous thirty-year plans was
“bathtub-shaped” (i.e., the total number of attack submarines was pro-
jected to fall below the force-level goal of forty-eight boats in the 2020s and
then get back up to forty-eight by the early 2030s), is now projected to be
more open-ended. That is, under the new thirty-year plan the attack sub-
marine force is not projected to get back up to forty-eight boats by the end
of the thirty-year period.
• The previous (FY 2009–FY 2038) thirty-year shipbuilding plan did not
show a shortfall in cruisers and destroyers. The new (FY 2011–FY 2040)
plan shows the cruiser-destroyer fleet falling below the eighty-eight-ship
force-level goal for these ships to a low of sixty-seven in 2034 before in-
creasing to the middle seventies by the end of the thirty-year period. The
eighty-eight-ship goal, like other elements of the 313-ship plan, dates to
2006. Some observers believe it should be increased to some higher number
to reflect increased demands for cruisers and destroyers resulting from the
administration’s plan, announced in September 2009, for using ballistic
missile defense (BMD)–capable Aegis cruisers and destroyers for European
BMD.
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of superiority in certain high-end combat sce-
narios could be reduced.
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It is not clear whether the Navy will be able to procure all 276 ships shown in
the thirty-year plan, for three reasons.
• Several Navy shipbuilding programs have experienced significant cost
growth in recent years. If some of the ships in the plan turn out to be more
expensive than estimated, the projected funding profile in the plan will
likely be insufficient to build all the ships intended. Programs that might be
considered risks for cost growth include the Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) class
of aircraft carriers (first ship procured in FY 2008); the Flight III Arleigh
Burke (DDG 51)–class Aegis destroyer (first ship to be procured FY 2016);
the LSD(X) amphibious ship (first ship to be procured FY 2017); and the
SSBN(X) (first ship to be procured FY 2019). The Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) estimates for all these ships are higher than the Navy estimates.3
• The shipbuilding funding profile shown in the plan presumes the availabil-
ity of an additional two billion dollars or so per year in constant dollars in
the middle years of the plan—when the Navy plans to procure the twelve
SSBN(X)s. There is little in the Navy’s report on the plan, however, to ex-
plain how this “hump” in shipbuilding funding will be realized, particularly
in the context of a budget that experiences little or no real growth. If this
hump in funding were not realized, the Navy might not be able to fund nu-
merous ships now shown in the plan. A draft version of the thirty-year plan
that was reported by the defense trade press in December 2009 showed a
scenario in which the shipbuilding budget was not increased to pay for the
twelve planned SSBN(X)s. In that scenario the total number of ships built
over the thirty-year plan dropped to 222 and the total number of ships in
the Navy to declined to 237 by the end of the thirty-year period.4
• As a result of the financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent developments, the
nation is facing significant projected budget deficits and significant pro-
jected growth in the debt-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratio. CBO’s
March 2010 estimate of the administration’s FY 2011 budget submission
shows annual deficits averaging 5.2 percent of GDP from FY 2011 through
2020 and debt as a percentage of GDP increasing from 63.2 percent in FY
2010 to 90 percent in 2020.5 Given that the DoD budget accounts for
roughly half of discretionary federal spending, if policy makers decide to
take steps to reduce substantially projected deficits and growth in the
debt-to-GDP ratio, the DoD budget could be reduced in real terms. This
could cause a reduction in the Navy’s budget, which could lead to ship-
building budgets that are smaller than what would remain in the thirty-
year plan without the above-discussed two-billion-dollar-per-year hump.
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If the Navy is not able to afford all 276 ships in the thirty-year shipbuilding
plan, the total number of ships in the fleet would, other things held equal, be less
than that shown in the thirty-year plan. A fleet below three hundred ships, per-
haps closer to 250 ships, is a possibility. The Navy might also experience short-
falls in some aircraft types, such as strike fighters (where a shortfall is already
projected).
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A SMALLER FLEET
Although tomorrow’s ships will in many cases have more individual capability
than today’s, a fleet of fewer than three hundred ships, and perhaps closer to
250, could be hard-pressed to meet regional combatant commander requests
for forward-deployed Navy ships. If limits on resources lead not only to re-
duced ship and aircraft numbers but also to smaller investments in capabili-
ties, the Navy’s margin of superiority in certain high-end combat scenarios
could be reduced, which could increase operational risks in conflict situations.
The implications of a Navy that is substantially below its force-level goals and
perhaps lacking certain desired mission capabilities could be particularly signif-
icant in the Pacific. U.S. Navy capabilities in that region could affect the likeli-
hood or possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the
Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict
to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U.S.-Chinese economic link-
ages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both sides.
In the absence of such a conflict, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific
could influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including
choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United
States. In this sense, decisions on U.S. Navy programs for countering improved
Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political evolution of the
Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals
relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.
OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING THIS SITUATION
Options for dealing with the prospect described above include but are not lim-
ited to the following. The options are not mutually exclusive, are in some cases
overlapping, and are presented in no particular order. Each option poses either
feasibility challenges or potential downsides.
• Increase DoD’s budget in real terms.
• Increase the Navy’s share of DoD’s budget.
• Find more Navy cost-saving efficiencies.
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• Exploit joint Navy–Air Force combat effectiveness, particularly in the Pa-
cific, through the Air-Sea Battle concept.
• Reduce the cost of Navy shipbuilding programs.
• Shift to a more highly distributed fleet architecture.
• Extend the service lives of in-service ships and aircraft.
• Increase the use of forward homeporting, multiple crewing, and long-
duration deployments with crew rotation.
• Increase the use of unmanned vehicles to augment or substitute for
manned ships and aircraft.
• Reduce levels of forward deployments in some regions while maintaining
them in others.
• Transfer Navy responsibilities to other U.S. military forces or federal
agencies.
• Transfer “low end” Navy missions to allied and partner navies and coast
guards, concentrating available Navy resources on programs for “high end”
combat capabilities for countering improved Chinese maritime military
forces.
• Encourage allies and partners to do more in terms of fielding naval and
other forces for countering Chinese forces.
Each of these is discussed very briefly below.
Increase DoD’s Budget in Real Terms. The change in projected budget deficits
and the projected debt-to-GDP ratio that has developed since the 2008 financial
crisis make this option difficult to implement. To the contrary, as mentioned
earlier, given DoD’s share of discretionary federal spending, if policy makers
take steps to reduce substantially projected budget deficits and the projected in-
crease in the debt-to-GDP ratio, DoD’s budget might be reduced rather than
increased in real terms.
Increase the Navy’s Share of DoD’s Budget. Supporters of naval forces could
seek to open a debate about the value of sea-based forces relative to land-based
forces in defending the nation’s interests in coming years, with the aim of shift-
ing a greater share of DoD’s budget to the former. Supporters of such a shift
could argue that American access to overseas land bases in coming years could
be limited or uncertain; that those bases are fixed in location and thus highly
vulnerable to attack by theater-range ballistic missiles and other forces; and that
U.S. forces based on foreign soil could face host-nation limits on how they are
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used. Supporters could argue that a large percentage of the world’s population
and economic activity is located in littoral areas; that sea-based forces can pro-
ject power into and otherwise influence events in littoral areas while operating
in international waters without permission from other countries; that sea-based
forces can use the sea as a medium of maneuver to avoid detection, targeting, or
attack; and that sea-based forces can easily move closer to shore or back over the
horizon, as needed, to achieve desired political effects. They could also argue
that China’s military modernization effort will make the Pacific a key U.S. mili-
tary operating area in coming years and that the geography of the Pacific makes
it a primarily maritime and aerospace theater.
As compelling as these argu-
ments might appear to supporters
of naval forces, attempts to shift a
greater share of DoD’s budget to
naval forces could face strong headwinds. Current U.S. military operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan tend to focus attention on the value and needs of the
ground forces rather than of the Navy. The Navy’s emphasis in recent years on its
contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan might actually reinforce this dynamic.
While operations in Iraq appear to be winding down, those in Afghanistan may
continue for several more years, extending the focus on ground forces for some
time. Even when operations in Afghanistan wind down, advocates of land-based
forces could argue that weak or instable governments in other countries of inter-
est to the United States make it possible, if not likely, that the United States will
engage in similar operations in the future. Navy leaders in recent years have been
stressing the fleet’s value in engagement, partner capacity building, and human-
itarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) operations. Emphasizing these
operations helps demonstrate the Navy’s day-to-day relevance but does little to
make a case for shifting to it a greater share of DoD’s budget, because such oper-
ations do not appear to require investment in expensive, high-end combat capa-
bilities. A stronger case for such investments might be made by placing more
stress on the need to counter improved Chinese military forces in coming years,
but the executive branch appears averse to putting China nearer the center of the
public discussion of American defense plans and programs.
Last, it can be noted that even gaining a larger share of DoD’s budget might
not result in a substantial increase in funding for Navy programs if the DoD’s
budget is at the same time reduced.
Find More Navy Cost-Saving Efficiencies. The Navy in recent years has imple-
mented a number of cost-saving efficiency measures. Among other things, it has
closed and realigned bases, reformed its approach to maintenance, implemented
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energy-saving initiatives ashore and on ships, and reduced its end strength. The
Navy continues to look for additional cost-saving efficiencies and will likely find
some, but it is not clear that such initiatives by themselves will be sufficient to re-
solve the service’s programs-vs.-resources situation fully. Future reductions in
end strength may be difficult to achieve, given the reductions the Navy has al-
ready made, and savings from past end-strength reductions have been offset by
increases in per capita personnel costs.
Exploit Joint Navy–Air Force Combat Effectiveness through Air-Sea Battle.
DoD’s final report on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review states, in its section
on deterring and defeating aggression in antiaccess environments, that
the Air Force and Navy together are developing a new joint air-sea battle concept for
defeating adversaries across the range of military operations, including adversaries
equipped with sophisticated antiaccess and area denial capabilities. The concept will
address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all operational do-
mains—air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace—to counter growing challenges to U.S.
freedom of action. As it matures, the concept will also help guide the development of
future capabilities needed for effective power projection operations.6
In theory, joint efficiencies created through closer integration of Navy and Air
Force operations under the Air-Sea Battle concept could reduce requirements
for certain Navy and Air Forces assets. It is not clear, however, how much effect
Air-Sea Battle will have in this regard. It can also be noted that development of
the concept could conceivably increase requirements for certain Navy and Air
Force assets by uncovering gaps in joint capabilities.
Reduce Cost of Navy Shipbuilding Programs. The Navy in recent years has re-
duced the cost of its shipbuilding programs by, among other things, incorporat-
ing significant numbers of LCSs and JHSVs in the 313-ship plan, canceling the
planned CG(X) cruiser in favor of the Flight-III DDG 51 destroyer, and reduc-
ing numbers and capabilities of new maritime-prepositioning ships. The Navy
is also seeking to reduce shipbuilding costs through changes in acquisition strat-
egy and ship design.7 Some observers might advocate further reducing costs by
changing the Navy’s planned shipbuilding mix to include a larger number of less
expensive (but less capable) ships.8
Shift to a More Highly Distributed Fleet Architecture. Some observers in recent
years have advocated shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture fea-
turing a reduced reliance on carriers and other large ships and an increased reli-
ance on smaller ships, arguing that such an architecture could generate
comparable aggregate fleet capability at lower cost and be more effective at
confounding Chinese maritime antiaccess capabilities.9 Skeptics, including
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supporters of the currently planned fleet architecture, question both of these
arguments.
Extend Service Lives of In-Service Ships and Aircraft. One option for mitigating
the force-structure effects of reduced ship and aircraft procurement rates would
be to extend the lives of in-service ships and aircraft. Potential candidates would
include cruisers, destroyers, and attack submarines. The thirty-year plan con-
templates operating the twenty-two Ticonderoga (CG 47)–class Aegis cruisers
and twenty-eight Flight I/II Arleigh Burke–class Aegis destroyers to age
thirty-five and the growing number of Flight-IIA DDG 51s to age forty. A poten-
tial goal for a service-life-extension program for these ships would be to increase
all their operating lives to forty-five years. The thirty-year plan contemplates op-
erating the final twenty-three submarines of the Los Angeles (SSN 688) class (i.e.,
the Improved Los Angeles–class boats) and the three Seawolf (SSN 21)–class
boats to age thirty-three. A potential service-life-extension goal for these ships
would be to increase that figure by ten or more years, which would require nu-
clear refuelings.
The feasibility and costs of such service-life extensions would need to be ex-
amined. Feasibility could be a particular issue for the attack submarines, given
limits on pressure-hull life. The limited growth margins of the existing cruisers
and destroyers could also pose challenges. Ships identified for service-life exten-
sion would likely need enhanced maintenance in coming years to ensure that
they are in good enough condition at the end of their normal service lives to have
them extended, which would increase maintenance costs.
Increase Use of Forward Homeporting, Multiple Crewing, and “Sea Swap.”
Another option for mitigating the effects of reduced ship force structure would
be to make greater use of forward homeporting, multiple crewing, and long-
duration deployments with crew rotation (an initiative known as “Sea Swap”).
More forward homeporting could involve shifting additional attack submarines
to Hawaii and Guam; forward-homeporting BMD-capable Aegis ships in Eu-
rope (to reduce the number of such ships needed for sustaining BMD operations
in that region); moving additional surface ships to such existing homeporting
locations as Hawaii, Guam, Japan, and Bahrain; and perhaps establishing new
forward-homeporting locations in such places as Singapore, Australia, or India.
Surface ships would be candidates for both multiple crewing and Sea Swap, at-
tack submarines for multiple crewing.
Additional forward homeporting, multiple crewing, and Sea Swap could help
a fleet with fewer ships maintain desired levels of day-to-day forward deploy-
ments but might do little to mitigate shortfalls in required numbers of ships for
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wartime operations. Forward homeporting in foreign countries carries a possi-
bility of host-nation limits on how the ships are used and a risk of sudden evic-
tion following shifts in host-nation policy, particularly those that might result
from changes in government. Multiple crewing and Sea Swap would likely in-
crease ship operation and support costs and more quickly consume ship service
lives, which could eventually make it more difficult to maintain force levels.
Increase Use of Unmanned Vehicles. The Navy is currently developing and de-
ploying a variety of air, surface, and underwater unmanned vehicles (UVs). In
theory, UVs might reduce required numbers of ships and manned aircraft by
substituting for those platforms in certain missions or by extending their capa-
bilities. UVs, however, are more suitable for some missions than others; have
their own development, procurement, operation, and support costs (including
for remote human operators); and pose their own development risks, particu-
larly in the case of UVs intended for autonomous operations.
Reduce Levels of Forward Deployments in Some Regions. Another option would
be to reduce levels of naval forward deployments in some regions while main-
taining desired levels in others. One approach would be to maintain naval de-
ployments in the Pacific, so as to counter improved Chinese maritime military
forces, while reducing forward deployments elsewhere. The administration’s
new plan for European BMD operations would make it more difficult at the
margin to implement that particular possibility, since it will require increasing
the number of Aegis ships deployed to European waters. More generally, reduc-
ing naval forward deployments to some regions could reduce the deterrence of
potential aggressors and the reassurance of allies, Navy engagement and partner
capacity–building operations, and ability to respond quickly to contingencies in
those regions. It could also encourage perceptions, both in those regions and
elsewhere, of the United States as a declining power, which could make it more
difficult to achieve U.S. policy goals of various kinds.10
Transfer Navy Responsibilities to Other U.S. Forces and Agencies. In theory,
there are several possibilities for transferring Navy responsibilities to other U.S.
military services or federal agencies.11 Implementing these options might reduce
Navy funding requirements but might not necessarily improve the service’s
programs-vs.-resources challenge if the funding for meeting these responsibili-
ties were shifted out of the Navy’s budget along with the responsibilities them-
selves. Skeptics might argue that these responsibilities currently reside with the
Navy because they are most cost-effectively performed by the Navy and that
transferring them consequently could increase government costs or result in
these tasks being carried out less fully.
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Another option that has been mentioned would be to reduce or eliminate the
amphibious-assault mission, on the grounds that it is unlikely to be needed in
the future. Opponents would argue that it is difficult to predict the kinds of op-
erations the United States might need to conduct in the future, that amphibious
ships are valuable for engagement and partner capacity building, and that these
ships and associated ship-to-shore transfer capabilities are especially useful for
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, which are not only of hu-
manitarian value but also generate significant political benefits for the United
States.
Transfer Low-End Navy Missions to Allies and Partners. Another option would
be to transfer such missions as engagement, partner capacity building, and mar-
itime security (including antipiracy operations)—to allies and partners, on the
grounds that allied and partner navies and coast guards are capable of perform-
ing them. Under this option, the Navy would concentrate its resources more
heavily on “high end” combat capabilities, such as those required for countering
improved Chinese maritime forces. Whether allied or partner navies would be
willing to take on new or expanded responsibilities for low-end operations is
uncertain. Also, transferring them to other navies and coast guards might free
up only a relatively modest amount of Navy funding and would reduce the polit-
ical and interoperability benefits the United States currently receives from
performing low-end missions.
Encourage Allies and Partners to Do More to Counter Improved Chinese Forces.
One more option would be to encourage allies and partners to do more in terms
of fielding naval and other forces for countering improved Chinese maritime
military forces. Countries that might be candidates include Japan, South Korea,
Australia, and India. Even without American encouragement, Chinese military
modernization might persuade one or more of these countries to modernize or
expand their military forces; Australia and India might be viewed as already tak-
ing steps in this direction. It is not clear whether American encouragement
would result in countries’ taking more steps along these lines than they other-
wise might, particularly since these other countries must contend with their
own constraints on what they can spend on their military forces. This option
could pose risks for the United States, because the interests and policy goals of
allies and partners do not always coincide with U.S. interests and goals, and be-
cause a change in the government of an ally or partner could lead to a change in
its security policy.
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N O T E S
This article (in slightly different form) was
originally prepared for and delivered to a
workshop, “Economics and Security:
Resourcing National Priorities,” sponsored
by the Naval War College’s William B. Ruger
Chair of National Security Economics and
held at the College on 19–21 May 2010. It ap-
pears in essentially the present version, in the
proceedings of that conference available at
www.usnwc.edu/rugerpapers. The views ex-
pressed here are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Con-
gressional Research Service, the Library of
Congress, or Congress.
1. DON’s FY 2011 baseline budget request of
$160.6 billion includes $46.6 billion for pro-
curement, of which $16.1 billion is for ship-
building. Rear Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Budget, “Department of the Navy FY 2011
President’s Budget,” briefing, 1 February
2010, p. 5.
2. The Navy plans to achieve and maintain a
force level of fifty-five LCSs and about
twenty-three JHSVs.
3. Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of
the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan
(Washington, D.C.: May 2010), p. 14, table 3.
4. Inside the Navy, 7 December 2009, tables. See
also Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy Confronts
$80 Billion Cost of New Ballistic Missile Sub-
marines (Updated),” Inside the Pentagon, 3
December 2009.
5. Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of
the President’s Budgetary Proposal for Fiscal
Year 2011 (Washington, D.C.: April 2010),
table 1-1 (“Comparison of Projected Reve-
nues, Outlays, and Deficits in CBO’s March
2010 Baseline and CBO’s Estimate of the
President’s Budget”), available at www.cbo
.gov.
6. U.S. Defense Dept., Quadrennial Defense Re-
view Report (Washington, D.C.: February
2010), pp. 32–33.
7. These measures include the following, among
other things: exerting more discipline in estab-
lishing performance requirements for new
ships; resisting subsequent growth in those re-
quirements; working toward more stability in
shipbuilding plans; making use of competition
where possible in the awarding of contracts for
building ships; using fixed-price-type ship-
building contracts; making greater use of com-
mon hulls, systems, and components and
seeking greater cross-yard and cross-firm effi-
ciencies in shipbuilding, so as to regain lost
economies of scale in shipbuilding; increasing
the use of modularity in ship design and
construction; increasing the use of open-
architecture combat systems; incorporating
improved design-for-producibility features
and making better use of production engineer-
ing in developing new ship designs; developing
technologies for reducing the size, weight, and
cost of shipboard systems; incorporating tech-
nologies for reducing crew size; and develop-
ing improved construction processes and
methods, such as those developed by the Na-
tional Shipbuilding Research Program
(NSRP). Some observers might advocate addi-
tional measures, such as consolidating Navy
shipbuilding into a smaller number of ship-
yards (which would be strongly resisted by
supporters of the yards that would lose their
Navy shipbuilding business and perhaps face
possible downsizing or even closure) or build-
ing U.S. Navy ships in foreign shipyards or
acquiring foreign-built ships for Navy use
(which would require a change in federal law
and be strongly resisted by supporters of
American shipyards).
8. Possibilities that some observers might advo-
cate could include building conventionally
powered aircraft carriers instead of nuclear-
powered carriers (which would reduce their
mobility and combat sustainability and per-
haps achieve only a small savings in total
life-cycle costs), building smaller aircraft car-
riers (which would embark smaller and less
capable air wings), and supplementing the
Navy’s nuclear-powered attack submarines
with conventionally powered boats (whose
mobility limitations might make them un-
suitable for performing typical U.S. Navy
submarine missions).
9. For an example of a study outlining a more
highly distributed naval force architecture,
see Stuart E. Johnson and Arthur K.
Cebrowski, Alternative Fleet Architecture De-
sign, Defense & Technology Paper 19 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Center for Technology and
3 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWCR_Autumn2010-O’Rourke.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Autumn2010\NWCR_Autumn2010.vp
Thursday, August 19, 2010 1:23:50 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 4, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss4/5
National Security, National Defense Univ.,
August 2005). See also Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.,
The New Navy Fighting Machine: A Study of
the Connections between Contemporary Policy,
Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the
Composition of the United States Fleet (Monte-
rey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, Aug-
ust 2009).
10. For further discussion of options for reduc-
ing levels of forward deployments in some re-
gions, see Daniel Whiteneck et al., The Navy
at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at
Stake? (Alexandria, Va.: CNA, March 2010).
11. These might include, among other things, the
following: shifting a greater share of the stra-
tegic nuclear deterrence mission to Air Force
intercontinental ballistic missiles and bomb-
ers; transferring Navy tactical aircraft
missions, including strike and airborne elec-
tronic warfare, from carrier-based aircraft to
the Air Force; transferring intelligence and
surveillance responsibilities from attack sub-
marines or other Navy platforms to non-
Navy intelligence and surveillance assets;
transferring special operations forces (SOF)
missions from the Navy SEALs to Army and
Air Force SOF; transferring engagement and
partner capacity–building responsibilities to
the Air Force and Army; transferring Navy
homeland-security responsibilities, and po-
tential Navy responsibilities for Arctic surface
and air operations, to the Coast Guard; and
transferring Navy responsibilities for HADR
operations to the Air Force, Army, Coast
Guard, and civilian U.S. agencies, such as the
Federal Emergency Management Agency or
the State Department.
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